





CEP Discussion Paper No 864 
April 2008 
Union Decline in Britain 
David G. Blanchflower and Alex Bryson 
  
   
Abstract 
This paper investigates the demise of unionisation in British private sector 
workplaces over the last quarter century.  We show that dramatic union decline has 
occurred across all types of workplace.  Although the union wage premium persists 
it is quite small in 2004.  Negative union effects on employment growth and 
financial performance are largely confined to the 1980s.  Managerial perceptions of 
the climate of relations between managers and workers has deteriorated since the 
early 1980s across the whole private sector, whether the workplace is unionised or 
not.  
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Introduction 
 
Declining trade union density is a feature of most, though not all, developed countries in the 
last quarter century (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1999; Visser, 2003),  Although unionization 
remains an important feature in public sector employment, unions’ decline in the private 
sector has been rapid.  Britain is no exception: it has seen a substantial decline in the 
propensity of workers to join unions and a fall in the incidence of workplace-level union 
recognition by employers for pay bargaining.  It is often assumed that union decline is an 
inevitable consequence of structural change in the economy and, in particular, the demise of 
large-scale manufacturing plants.  Of course, decline in once strong union bastions of the 
economy has deprived unions of members, but employer engagement with unions is not 
purely a function of industry location.  Rather, in the voluntarist climate that prevailed until 
recently, it was an employer choice, albeit a constrained one influenced by employer and 
worker bargaining power.  Further, it does not necessarily follow that unions will be unable 
to colonise new workplaces and new occupations.  It is also assumed that union decline must, 
inevitably, entail a diminution in the effects unions have on workers and firms.  Of course the 
effects of unions on workers and firms across the economy will diminish with a decline in 
their incidence.  But, a priori, it is unclear what effect unions will have on those workplaces 
that remain unionized.  Unions’ effects will depend on their ability to do what they have 
traditionally done, namely bargain on behalf of their members using their ability to restrict 
the supply of labour as a bargaining tool, and to act as the representative voice of workers to 
management (Freeman and Medoff, 1984),  Whether unions are able to do so depends on 
which unions remain – the strong ones, the weak ones, or perhaps a mixture of the two.  Their 
effects also depend upon firms’ preparedness and ability to either resist union demands or 
accommodate them.  
 
Figure 1 reports data on the hundred year trends in union density rates in the UK, the USA 
and Canada.  It is apparent that all three countries saw a rising trend with a peak at the end of 
World War 1 and another at the end of the Second World War.  The UK and Canada saw 
further increases during the 1960s and 1970s.  Both the UK and the US have experienced 
dramatic declines in density since the late 1970s.  The US decline started in the 1950s and 
predates that of the UK that started around 1980, the year in which the first Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey was conducted.   
 
There have been somewhat different trends in the public and private sectors in the three 
countries.  Table 1 provides details of changes in overall density rates as well as in the public 
and private sector by year since 1993 for Great Britain.  Both the Labour Force Surveys and 
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys show declines in union density in the private and the 
public sectors. 
 
In this paper we examine the decline in unionization in the private sector and consider the 
role played by compositional change in workplaces.  We then move on to look at changes in 
the impact of unions on four outcomes: wages, employment growth, financial performance 
and the climate of relations between managers and workers.  Our primary data source is the 
five Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys conducted in 1980, 1984, 1990, 1998 and 2004.  
These cover workplaces that employ at least 25 employees, either full or part-time.  However, 
this threshold was lowered in the more recent surveys so, for some investigations, we include 
workers in workplaces with 5 or more employees.  The 25-employee selection rule means 
that the survey covers roughly two-thirds of employees each year.  These surveys exclude the   2
self-employed, who were approximately 13% of workers over the period (Blanchflower and 
Shadforth, 2007), 
 
Our main finding is that the negative effects of unions observed in the 1980s has diminished 
and, in most instances, disappeared.  There is evidence that unions still have a significant 
impact on wages, but the size of this effect is quite small, especially in larger workplaces. We 
also find statistically significant evidence that unions negatively affect employment growth, 
financial performance and the climate of relations between employees and managers.  This 
evidence is strongest when examining the WIRS surveys for the early 1980s but is also 
present when all five of the WIRS data files are pooled and, in the case of employment 
growth and industrial relations climate, we cannot reject the possibility that there has been no 
significant time trend. However, unionised workplaces have closed the financial performance 
gap on non-unionised workplaces. It would appear that union power has diminished 
somewhat over the years since Margaret Thatcher took on the unions in the early 1980s.  In 
this respect, industrial relations in Britain is quite different from what it was like when the 
first WIRS was carried out by Bill Daniel and Neil Millward in 1980 (Daniel and Millward, 
1981),  Nevertheless, union effects have not totally disappeared. 
 
 
1.  The Decline of Private Sector Union Recognition 
 
If one wishes to divide workplaces into those that are unionised and those that are not, the 
simplest method is to establish whether the employer recognises one or more unions for pay 
bargaining. In WERS union recognition relates to whether one or more unions are recognised 
for purposes of bargaining over pay and/or conditions for one or more groups of workers at 
that workplace.  This coverage may arise from an agreement at workplace, organisation or 
industry-level. 
 
Table 2 reports union recognition rates in the private sector in 1980 and 2004 by workplace 
characteristics.  The most striking finding is that union recognition has fallen precipitously 
across every workplace characteristic – no sector or group has been immune.  The decline in 
recognition rates has been greatest in ‘Energy and Water’, the East and West Midlands and 
the biggest workplaces, all of which experienced declines of over 40 percentage points.   
Declines were smallest in ‘Other Services’ (-5 percentage points) and East Anglia (-7 
percentage points) where unionisation rates have traditionally been very low.  In both 1980 
and 2004 the workplaces with the lowest union recognition rates were single independent 
establishments.  Workplaces in ‘Energy and Water’ were the most heavily unionised at the 
beginning and the end of the period, despite experiencing rapid de-unionisation.   
 
Nineteen-eighty appears to have been a watershed in workplace union recognition, as well as 
union membership density. The recognition rate among workplaces set up prior to 1980 is 
double that for workplaces set up in the 1980s onwards.  Millward et al (2000: 101-103), 
commenting on this cohort effect, speculated that the move away from union recognition 
may, in fact, have started much earlier, perhaps as early as the early post-War period. But 
Table 2 points to another interesting phenomenon, namely the decline in union recognition 
among workplaces set up before 1980.  Their union recognition rate fell from 50 percent in 
1980 to 32 percent in 2004 – a decline of just over one-third.  There has also been a decline in 
union recognition rates among those set up in the 1990s: in 1998 their recognition rate was 20   3
percent but this had fallen to 15 percent by 2004.
1  This is surprising.  It is often argued that 
union de-recognition is a rare occurrence in Britain, and that the demise of unions is largely 
accounted for by new workplaces choosing not to recognise trade unions (Willman et al., 
2007),  The evidence here suggests that this is not the whole story by any means.  Workplace 
closure rates are largely unaffected by unionisation (Machin, 1995; Bryson, 2004a; Bryson 
and Dale-Olsen, 2008) so that much of the decline in the unionisation rate among older 
workplaces may be due to union de-recognition.
2  More important though, is that new 
workplaces are being born that are primarily non-union. 
 
To establish the independent effect of workplace characteristics on union recognition we run 
linear probability models of union recognition using Ordinary Least Squares estimation for 
each of the five years of data pooled together (Table 3, column 1) and then separately for 
each year in the remaining columns.  These equations estimate the probability of a randomly 
selected workplace being unionised, conditional on its characteristics.  The models account 
for roughly one-fifth of the variance in union recognition in Britain.  The results are broadly 
consistent with those reported above based on the descriptive means.  There has been a 
decline in the probability of union recognition with time, primarily between 1980 and 1998, 
but since then there has been little change; indeed, the difference in coefficients between 
1998 and 2004 is not statistically significant (t=1.17),   
 
There are substantial and persistent industry differences: ‘Distribution, Hotels and Catering’ 
has by far the lowest probability of unionisation, while ‘Energy and Water’ has the highest.  
There are also sizeable region effects in all years with the probability of unionisation being 
the lowest in the South East of England.  Throughout the period the probability of recognition 
tends to rise with workplace size, but the effect has weakened a little over time.  The negative 
effect of being a single independent establishment, on the other hand, has remained strong a 
persistent over time, reducing the probability of recognition by around one-quarter.  The table 
also includes three variables capturing the workforce composition at the workplace, namely 
the percentage of females, the percentage of part-timers and the percentage of non-manual 
workers.  In the early period the probability of union recognition was lower in workplaces 
with a high proportion of non-manual workers and those with a high proportion of female 
employees.  However, these effects have disappeared over time, mirroring the disappearance 
in the union membership gap between males and females and manual and non-manual 
workers (Bryson and Gomez, 2003), 
 
It is sometimes argued that union decline is largely due to death of old industries and large 
workplaces which were once bastions of unionism.  Table 2 showed that this is far from 
being the whole story since union recognition declined across all sectors and types of 
workplace.  To establish how much of the decline is accounted for by compositional change 
we use the models in Table 3 to predict what the recognition rate would have been if the 
composition of workplaces had remained constant since 1980.  The results are presented in 
Table 4.  Roughly one-third of the twenty-eight percentage point decline in private sector 
union recognition is attributable to changes in workplace characteristics that are contained in 
the model.  The remaining two-thirds of the decline is not related to the structure of 
                                                 
1 Substantial declines are also apparent among workplaces set up in the 1980s.  The union recognition rate was 
47 percent among this group in 1980-84 but this had fallen to 16 percent by 2004. 
 
2 Bryson (2004a) finds some evidence of a positive union effect on workplace closure, but the effect is sensitive 
to the closure measure used. 
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workplaces or their workforce composition, but to ‘within-group change’ which might be 
interpreted as the choices employers make, conditional on their observable characteristics.  
This finding is consistent with studies which suggest that a large part of the decline in 
unionisation is due to employers turning their back on trade unions – preferring to ‘go’ or 
‘remain’ non-union (see, for example, Bryson et al., 2004),  One possible reason for this 
might be the damage that employers feel unions might do at the workplace, an issue to which 
we now turn. 
 
 
2.  How Have Union Effects on Workplaces Changed Over Time? 
 
What are the implications of this massive decline in unionisation for union effects on 
workplace outcomes such as wages, performance and climate?  We need to distinguish 
between their effects on unionised workplaces, on the one hand, and their effects on the non-
union sector on the other.   
 
The effect unions have on unionised workplaces arises from the direct impact they have on 
pay determination and as a ‘voice’ mechanism (Freeman and Medoff, 1984),  A priori it is 
unclear what the effects of shrinkage in the union sector will be on those workplaces that 
remain unionised.  Are the unions that remain the strongest ones – as would be the case if the 
weak had ‘gone to the wall’?  Alternatively, are the ones that remain the ineffectual unions 
that have such a minimal impact that employers are happy to let them simply “whither on the 
vine”?  The effects of this decline will depend in large part on the bargaining strength of the 
unions that remain compared to their strength back in 1980.  Although it is often asserted that 
unions have less influence and bargaining power than they used to, the remark is usually 
made when discussing aggregate outcomes at the level of the economy.  
 
There are two schools of thought regarding the bargaining power of unions at workplace 
level.  The first is that most of that power has gone, primarily because of increased 
competition from the growing domestic non-unionised sector and lower labour cost 
competitors elsewhere in the world.  The result is that any union success in bargaining above 
market wages and conditions will erode the firm’s competitive advantage, unless those 
additional costs can be recouped with improved productivity.  In this narrative, the only 
reason unions remain in place at all is because employers don’t need to take account of them 
and may, in some instances, find them useful in effecting workplace changes.  They are, to 
some degree, “hollow shells”.   
 
The second school of thought is that, whilst the first story is often true, there are plenty of 
instances in which unions continue to monopolise the supply of labour to firms which are less 
dependent on cost-based comparative advantage for their profits.  These firms include those 
in highly regulated sectors and those facing little or no domestic or foreign competition.  
Indeed, some argue it is only those unions that are strong who have been able to survive 
union decline.  WIRS data for the period through to 1998 suggested that there was a 
bifurcation of union strength in British workplaces: some unions continued to show signs of 
organizational strength in terms of high membership and high collective bargaining coverage, 
but there was a long tail of weaker unions (Millward et al., 2000, Chapter 5), 
 
When Freeman and Medoff addressed the question ‘what do unions do?’ they concluded that 
they ‘compressed things’ – not just wages, but other things too.  However, union behaviour 
may spill over into the non-union sector through two counter-veiling forces.  First, it may   5
produce employment spill-over from the union to the non-union sector by setting above-
market terms and conditions which lead to union job loss.  This results in a queue for jobs in 
the non-union sector that employers can use to their advantage to keep terms and conditions 
lower than they might otherwise be.  This depresses conditions in the non-union sector.  On 
the other hand, the possibility that workers may unionize in order to obtain union-like 
conditions means non-union employers pay higher wages than they might otherwise have 
paid in the absence of unions due to the threat of unionisation (Rosen, 1969),  The massive 
decline in unionization has important implications for employment-related outcomes in the 
non-union sector because it may affect the size and extent of employment spill-over and 
threat effects.  When unions are prevalent and strong – as they were in the early 1980s – these 
effects can be expected to be very marked.  However, when unions are largely absent, as is 
now the case in much of the private sector, one would expect these union spill-over and threat 
effects to be muted, and that is what we see.
 3 
 
How are union effects estimated?  Let us take the example of wage effects.  Usually union 
effects are estimated as (Wu–Wn)/Wn where Wu is wages in the union sector and Wn is wages 
in the non-union sector.  However, the overall union effect can only be estimated relative to a 
scenario in which unions are wholly absent.  This scenario – which can be written as (Wu – 
Wa)/Wa where Wu is wages in the union sector and Wa is wages in the same economy absent 
unions – is coming closer in Britain, especially when one considers the tail of small firms that 
are invariably non-union which don’t appear in WIRS.  Nevertheless a union sector still 
exists so union activity may still affect the non-union sector.  These effects on the non-union 
sector can be thought of as (Wn–Wa)/Wa where Wn is the wage in the non-union sector.  As 
noted above, these effects on the non-union sector may be either positive or negative: it is an 
empirical question. 
 
This framework can be extended using the same formulation to estimate the impact of unions 
on other outcomes over and above wages.  The literature on this is extensive (Bennett and 
Kaufman, 2007), With these thoughts in mind, the remainder of the section considers the 
impacts of unions in Britain on the following; a) wages b) employment growth c) financial 
performance and d) the climate of employment relations over time.  We do not seek to 
distinguish between unions’ direct effects on the union sector and their spill-over and threat 
effects in the non-union sector.  Our estimates can be interpreted as the net impact of these 
effects combined. 
 
2.1.  Wages and salaries 
Early studies examined the impact of union recognition on wages using the 1980 
(Blanchflower, 1984; Blanchflower, 1986; Stewart, 1987) and 1984 WIRS surveys 
(Blanchflower, Oswald and Garrett, 1990),  These studies indicated that the effect of unions 
on wages differed across types of worker, with manual workers tending to receive a higher 
union premium, driven in part by the closed shop.  Since then, of course, the closed shop has 
disappeared, workplace-level union density has declined and it has become increasingly 
                                                 
3 We can gauge the decline in the union threat effect from the predicted probability of union recognition among 
non-union workplaces using the models reported in Table 3.  Under these models, the mean predicted 
probability of union recognition among non-union workplaces fell from 37 percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 
2004.  This halving of the threat effect is of a similar magnitude to the actual fall in workplace union recognition 
over the period. Another sort of ‘spill-over’ discussed less frequently is that arising from the extension of 
collectively bargained terms and conditions to the non-union sector through statutory extensions.  These used to 
take the form of Fair Wages Resolutions and Schedule 11 of the Employment Protection Act. 
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difficult for unions to monopolise the supply of labour to firms (Millward et al., 2000),  The 
demise of the union sector and attenuation in union bargaining power might have resulted in 
a lower threat effect on wage setting in the non-union sector. In spite of these developments 
union threat effects continued to raise the wages of workers in the non-union sector in the 
1998 WIRS (Belfield and Heywood, 2001), What is more, union members continue to earn 
higher wages than non-members controlling for other factors.  Although the premium has 
diminished in recent years (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2007) it seems that the decline is at 
least, in part, a counter-cyclical rather than a secular decline.
4  
 
Estimates of the union wage premium in the first three WIRS relied on managers’ responses 
to questions on wages and unionisation relating to ‘typical’ workers from a variety of skill 
groups such as semi-skilled and skilled manuals, clerical workers and middle managers.   
Since 1998 the surveys have provided linked employer/employee data which allows us to 
estimate the impact of union membership and union recognition on employees’ wages at the 
level of the individual.  Table 5 reports estimates of the union membership and union 
recognition wage premium in the private sector using WIRS 2004.  The first three columns 
estimate union effects on the traditional WIRS population in workplaces with at least 25 
employees.  The remaining columns run the same estimates for the population in smaller 
workplaces with 5-24 employees traditionally omitted from WIRS.   
 
In the traditional WIRS population of employees in workplaces with at least twenty-five 
employees the union membership premium is around 8 per cent, dropping to 5-6 per cent 
with the inclusion of detailed individual job and workplace controls.  However, there appears 
to be no premium associated with union recognition.  This finding is robust to the exclusion 
of the union membership variable.   If one compares the wages of union members with non-
members in the same workplaces (by replacing the workplace controls with workplace fixed 
effects) the premium attached to membership is 4 per cent.
5  These findings suggest that the 
union wage premium attached to workplace union recognition identified in analyses of early 
WIRS surveys has disappeared.  However, there remains a small but statistically significant 
premium associated with union membership.  The picture is rather different among the 
smallest workplaces with 5-24 employees.  Here the raw union membership premium is 20 
percent but falls by half when controls are added.  It remains 8 percent when union 
recognition is added. Although there is no premium attached to union recognition in models 
incorporating union membership, if union membership is removed much of the premium 
attached to it transfers to the union recognition variable.
6   If one replaces the workplace-level 
variables with workplace fixed effects the membership premium in workplaces with 5-24 
employees is 8 percent.  There are three striking conclusions.  First, the exclusion of the 
smallest workplaces from the traditional WIRS sample results in an underestimate of union 
effects on wages.  Second, the union recognition wage premium is confined to the smallest 
workplaces.  Third, union membership continues to generate a wage premium.
7 
                                                 
4 Blanchflower and Bryson (2003) find evidence for a counter-cyclical union wage premium in Britain and the 
United States in the last three decades of the Twentieth Century. 
 
5 The membership coefficient is 0.040 (t=4.13), 
 
6 In the small workplace model with controls, but excluding membership, the union recognition coefficient is 
0.061 (t=2.45), 
 
7 To establish whether there was any union threat effect we ran estimates for workers in non-unionised 
workplaces incorporating the predicted probability of workplace union recognition as an explanatory variable.  
It was not statistically significant.   7
 
Table 6 produces equivalent evidence from the Autumn Labour Force Surveys (LFS) which 
provide information on both wages and union membership status since 1993.  The premium 
has fallen a little from around 6 percent in 1993-99 to 3 percent in 2000-2006.  Among the 
traditional WIRS population of employees in workplaces with 25 or more employees the 
premium has fallen from 4-5 percent to a mere 1 percent.  As in the case of the WIRS 2004 
analysis, the premium is bigger among those in smaller workplaces.  In the LFS the 
membership premium among those in workplaces with fewer than 25 employees is 11% in 
1993-99 and 9% in 2000-2006.  Thus the decline in the premium since the early 1990s is 
largely confined to those in the WIRS workplace population.  It is unclear why the 
membership wage premium should be much larger in smaller workplaces throughout the 
period. 
 
2.2.  Employment growth 
The WIRS literature on unions’ employment effects has focused on changes in workplace 
employment levels in the private sector.  Early studies used retrospective data from managers 
on employment levels in earlier years to estimate union effects on employment change.  More 
recent studies have begun to use the WIRS panel data to obtain more accurate information.  A 
priori, union effects on employment growth are ambiguous.  The higher wage costs 
associated with trade unions might induce employers to substitute capital for labour, such that 
employment levels are lower in the union and the non-union sector.  On the other hand, if 
unions’ ability to capture rents discourages capital investment this may limit capital 
substitution.  If unions improve productivity, thus enhancing firms’ competitiveness, it is 
conceivable that employment levels and growth will be higher in the union than the non-
union sector.   In spite of these conflicting theoretical propositions studies tend to find that 
the average effect of union recognition is to lower employment growth by 2.5-4 per cent per 
annum relative to non-union workplaces, ceteris paribus (Blanchflower, Millward and 
Oswald, 1991; Machin and Wadhwani, 1991; Bryson, 2004b; Addison and Belfield, 2004),  
This has led some analysts to refer to the employment effect of unions as the ‘one constant’ 
in studies of unions’ economic effects (Addison and Belfield, 2004),   
 
In all years except 1980, mean workplace-level employment growth was positive (Table 7, 
row 1),  In every year employment growth was faster in non-union than union workplaces 
(rows 2 and 3), Following the WIRS tradition, Table 7 presents unweighted estimates of 
union effects on employment levels at the time of the survey.  The raw unadjusted gap is 
statistically significant in three of the five years (row 4),  The regression analysis in row 5 
conditions on the same workplace features as those used in the analyses of financial 
performance, but replaces establishment size dummy variables with continuous lagged 
employment one year previously (see the table footnote for details),  This regression-adjusted 
gap (which controls for other workplace characteristics) is only significant in 1984.  This is a 
surprising result since it runs counter to the general view that there is a robust negative 
association between unions and employment growth.  However, we formally tested for a 
trend in union effects over time by interacting union recognition with year dummies in the 
pooled analysis.  They were not jointly significant.  Nor were the interactions significantly 
different from the 1980 base year.  Thus we are unable to reject the hypothesis that there has 
been no significant change in the underlying negative union effect apparent in the pooled 
regression.  The conclusion we draw from this is that there is evidence from the whole period 
1980-2004 that unions have lowered employment growth, driven primarily by changes in the 
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early 1980s.  The evidence from the later period suggests that there are no effects but we do 
not find significant year*union interactions, mostly because of the large standard errors of the 
estimates from the later years.
8  The final column pools the three later years, and even though 
there is a significant raw union gap this disappears when controls are included.  It appears 
that there are no union employment effects in the data since 1990.  The result was the same 
when we experimented using union density rather than recognition. 
   
2.3.  Financial performance 
Unions enhance productivity where management are supportive of the union (Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984; Bryson et al., 2006) and where they are associated with high-performance 
management practices (Bryson et al., 2005),  Unions also appear to have closed the 
productivity gap with the non-union sector in the 1980s (Bryson et al., 2005),  Nevertheless, 
the broad consensus is that British unions have either a negative or benign effect on labour 
productivity (Metcalf, 2003; Pencavel, 2003),  If unions are generally unable to pay for the 
union wage premium with better productivity than the non-union sector, this implies that 
unions may hit company profits.  Their actions may adversely affect profits in other ways too.  
For instance, their ability to capture rents might reduce firms’ incentives to invest, while 
industrial action can damage the reputation of a firm with customers or directly affect its 
ability to sell goods or services (for a review see Metcalf, 2003),  For these reasons one might 
expect unions to have an adverse impact on firms’ financial performance.  
 
Since 1980 WIRS has asked managers: ‘Compared with other establishments in the same 
industry how would you assess your workplace’s financial performance?’  Respondents 
choose an answer on a five-point ordinal scale from ‘a lot above’ to ‘a lot below’ average.  
This subjective measure given by employment relations’ managers is not ideal.  However, it 
is a reasonable measure of performance in that it is predictive of subsequent closure 
probabilities and does not appear to be systematically biased with respect to union measures 
(Machin and Stewart, 1996), It is this measure that has been exhaustively analysed over the 
last quarter century (for reviews see Metcalf, 2003; Bryson, Forth and Kirby, 2005),  Early 
studies found unions were negatively associated with workplace financial performance in the 
1980s (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1988),  By WIRS 1990, the relationship between unions 
and financial performance was highly contingent on unions’ interaction with other factors 
such as market conditions, workplace practices, firm size and union strength (McNabb and 
Whitfield, 1997; Bryson, 1999; Addison et al., 2000; Machin and Stewart, 1996),  By 1998, 
most studies were finding no significant relationship (Bryson and Wilkinson, 2002; Addison 
and Belfield, 2001), leading to speculation that unions’ ability to extract rents from firms has 
diminished.   
 
Differences in methodologies across studies make it difficult to be sure about trends in the 
association between unionisation and workplace financial performance.  We overcome this 
problem in Table 8 which compares union/non-union differences in financial performance for 
each WIRS survey using an identical approach (see footnotes to the table for details),  Row 1 
shows the score for all workplaces in each WIRS survey: every year, on average, workplaces 
score themselves above average.  Rows 2 and 3 present the means for union and non-union 
workplaces.  Managers in unionised workplaces tend to score their workplaces more poorly 
than managers in non-union workplaces, but the raw gap is not significant after 1984 (row 4), 
This gap may be due to differences between union and non-union workplaces rather than to 
                                                 
8 The 95 percent confidence intervals for the union recognition point estimates were as follows: 1990 -.03 to 
+.02; 1998 -.04 to +.01; 2004 -.04 to +.02.   9
unionisation itself, so in the final row we present regression-adjusted estimates of the gap.  
The pooled analysis for all years shows a strong negative union effect having controlled for 
the observable features of workplaces detailed in the footnote to the table.  However, there 
has been considerable change over time in the relative performance of union and non-union 
workplaces.  The final column, which pools the last three years, confirms the view that there 
is no union effect on financial performance once controls are included and only weak 
evidence of any effect when they are not. This story tends to reflect the one emerging from 
the literature to date.  Unions were associated with poorer financial performance in the early 
1980s, but this difference has since disappeared due to an improvement in the relative 




2.4.  Employment relations climate 
Unions may have an adverse effect on managerial perceptions of climate where the 
bargaining process creates a ‘them and us’ mentality.  On the other hand, some employers 
value the role performed by unions and view it as a means of achieving more harmonious 
employment relations.  At the beginning of the WIRS series unions were notorious for 
industrial action.  WIRS played an important role in furnishing policy makers and academics 
with a range of climate-type measures to aid understanding of what engendered better 
employment relations in the workplace.  Among these measures was a question asked of 
managers which has been asked in every WIRS: ‘how would you rate the relationship 
between management and employees generally at this workplace?’  Respondents are asked to 
rate relations on a 5-point scale from ‘very good’ to ‘very poor’. This measure is associated 
with other climate measures (industrial action, the number of employment tribunal cases, 
sanctions against employees, days lost through sickness and absence) in the way one would 
imagine (Bryson, 2005; Kersley et al., 2006),  
 
Management perceptions of climate indicate an improvement in employment relations since 
1990 but relations appear poorer than they were in the early 1980s.  In both the union and 
non-union sectors the percentage of managers characterising employment relations as ‘very 
good’ fell by 16 percentage points between 1980 and 2004 (Table 9),  Of course, it is possible 
that the norms and expectations governing what constitutes a ‘good’ climate have shifted, in 
which case it would not be possible to infer change in the real world based on these 
perceptions. The table also shows that, whereas managerial perceptions of climate were 
poorer in union workplaces than in non-union workplaces in 1980-1990, the gap disappeared 
in 1998, only to open once again in 2004.    
 
Table 10 takes this descriptive analysis a stage further by isolating the independent effect of 
union recognition having controlled for other workplace characteristics.  The 5-point scale is 
collapsed into a 3-point scale where higher scores indicate better relations (see the footnotes 
to the table for details),
10  The descriptive means in row 3 show that in the non-union sector 
managerial perceptions of climate deteriorated markedly between 1980 and 1990 levelling 
                                                 
9 We formally test for a trend in union effects over time by interacting union recognition with year dummies in 
the pooled analysis.  The interaction effects for later years are statistically significant relative to 1984 (for 1990, 
.396, z=2.08; for 1998 .500, z=2.67; and for 2004 .366, z=1.91),  This is confirmed in analyses for the period 
1984-2004 which use the 5-point financial performance scale available only in those years. 
 
10 The results reported here are replicated when we use of a four-way climate variable that distinguishes between 
‘poor’, ‘average’, ‘good’ and ‘very good’. 
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out thereafter.  The means in row 2 show that, in the union sector, perceptions of climate fell 
between 1980 and 1990, but then improved somewhat in 1998 before deteriorating once 
again by 2004.  The raw gaps in perceived climate are sizeable and statistically significant in 
all five years.  However, some of the union-non-union difference is accounted for by 
differences in the characteristics of workplaces in the two sectors.  When these differences 
are taken into account the regression-adjusted gap was only statistically significant at 
conventional levels for the three years 1980, 1984 and 1990.  The gap was not statistically 
significant in 1998 and 2004.  This suggests that unions may not be as detrimental to the 
climate of employment relations as is often portrayed.  However, one has to be cautious when 
drawing such a conclusion.  We formally tested for a trend in union effects over time by 
interacting union recognition with year dummies in the pooled analysis.  They were not 
jointly significant at conventional levels.  Nor were the interactions significantly different 
from the 1980 base year.
 11  Thus we are unable to reject the hypothesis that there has been no 
significant change in the underlying negative union effect apparent in the pooled regression.  
Indeed, even in the final column that pools the last three years there is statistically weak 
evidence (t=1.76), of a negative, although smaller, union effect than was observed pre-1990. 
What is clear is that if managers thought that union decline would bring about a general 
improvement in the climate of employment relations they were wrong.  Indeed, managerial 
perceptions of climate have deteriorated considerably since the early 1980s across the whole 
private sector, whether the workplace is unionised or not.  As noted above, this deterioration 
seems to have occurred in the 1980s, with perceptions recovering a little since then, but 
remaining well below the perceptions of good climate in the early 1980s. 
 
To establish whether this finding was peculiar to the managerial perceptions of WIRS 
respondents we ran regressions using the British Social Attitudes Surveys for all employees 
in employment working 10 or more hours over the period 1983-2005.  The means in the first 
row of Table 11 show employees’ perceptions of the climate of worker/employee relations 
deteriorated over the period in the 1980s and 1990s but have since recovered.
 12  This pattern 
is apparent in both unionised and non-unionised workplaces though, in the case of non-
unionised workplaces perceptions remain less positive than they were in the early 1980s.    
Throughout the period perceptions of climate were poorer among employees in unionised 
workplaces than they were among those in non-unionised workplaces.  The raw gap (row 4) 
is partly explained by observable differences in the characteristics of workers, their jobs and 
their workplaces, but the regression-adjusted difference remains significant (row 5),  Thus, 
contrary to the WIRS analysis, these findings point to a persistent negative union effect on 
climate perceptions although, as suggested in the WIRS analysis, the gap between unionised 
and non-unionised workplaces appears to be closing. 
 
 
3.  Conclusion 
 
This paper has investigated the demise of unionisation in Britain over the last quarter century 
and the impact this has had on workplace industrial relations and performance.  We have 
shown that union decline is only partly due to compositional change among workplaces.  
Indeed, most of the decline is ‘within-group’ change and can be observed among all segments 
of the British workplace population.  This is the first attempt to investigate workplace union 
                                                 
11 The 95 percent confidence intervals for the union recognition point estimates were as follows: 1998 -.27 to 
+.26; 2004 -.45 to +.14. 
 
12 Drinkwater and Ingram (2005) found a U-shaped trend in perceptions of climate using BSA through to 2000.   11
effects using a standard estimation approach to look at identical outcomes over the last 
quarter century. Theoretically the effects of union decline on workplace outcomes are 
ambiguous.  The empirical evidence is also somewhat ambiguous.   
 
Union effects that are often taken as given – such as negative impacts on employment 
growth, financial performance and industrial relations climate – are not as evident in the more 
recent data as we might have imagined.  Although this may be because stronger unions with 
the power to disrupt business operations have died away, there is no evidence for this.  Indeed 
it seems that, if anything, the association between workplace closure and unionisation in the 
1990s was most evident where unions were weaker.  The alternative possibility is that unions 
have generally adopted a more collaborative approach to employers.  When we formally test 
for time trends they are statistically significant in the case of financial performance, showing 
a relative improvement of unionised workplaces relative to non-unionised workplaces since 
1984, but they are not significant in the case of employment growth or climate.  Thus, in the 
case of growth and climate we can not reject the hypothesis that there has been no significant 
change in the underlying negative union effects apparent in the pooled regressions.  This 
might seem surprising if one considers the point estimates each year.  But sample sizes are 
not large enough to precisely determine whether these estimates are significantly different 
from one another: confidence intervals for the point estimates are simply too large.  Union 
wage effects persist, although the size of those effects is small compared to earlier periods.   
 
A final word of caution is merited.  We are unable to establish whether any diminution in 
union effects is a secular or cyclical phenomenon.  We would expect smaller union effects 
when economic conditions are good because employers are often in a better position to 
concede union demands when they are profitable.  It is in economic downturns, when 
unionised labour proves better able than non-unionised labour to hold onto the gains it has 
made during good times that one expects union effects to come to the fore.     12
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Table 1:  Union decline in Great Britain 
 
a) Union membership 
                              Private             Public 
1993    24.0  64.4 
1994    22.8  63.6 
1995    21.5  61.4 
1996    20.7  60.9 
1997    19.8   60.8 
1998    19.5  61.0 
1999   19.3  59.9 
2000    18.7  60.0 
2001    18.5  59.0 
2002    18.1  59.3 
2003    18.1  58.8 
2004 17.1  58.4 
2005 17.1  58.2 
2006 16.5  58.5 
 
b) Union recognition 
                              Private           Public 
1980 50  94 
1984 48  99 
1990 38  87 
1998 24  87 
2004 22  87 
 
c) Union density – employee weighted 
                              Private           Public 
1980 57  84 
1984 45  81 
1990 36  72 
1998 25  58 
2004 20  58 
 
Source:  part a) Grainger and Crowther (2006) using individual data from the Autumn Labour 
Force Surveys, 1993-2006 (quarter 4 in 2006) and parts b) and c) Blanchflower and Bryson 
(2008) using establishment level data from the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys, 
1980-2004.   16
Table 2:  Private sector union recognition rates by workplace characteristics, 
1980 and 2004 
 
  % with recognition  % point fall  
 1980  2004  1980-2004 
Industry: 
Energy/water 99  58  41 
Mineral/chemicals 67  55  12 
Metal/engineering 65  27  38 
Other manufacturing  65  27  38 
Construction 52  19  33 
Distribution/Hotels & Catering  36  12  24 
Transport/Communications 59  39  20 
Banking etc  54  26  28 
Other services  26  19  7 
Region: 
East Anglia  42  37  5 
East Midlands  59  18  41 
North 55  16  39 
North West  60  19  41 
Scotland 62  41  21 
South West  54  21  33 
Wales 71  36  35 
West Midlands  65  21  44 
Yorkshire and Humber  54  37  17 
South East  38  15  23 
Establishment size: 
25-49 41  20  21 
50-99 50  13  37 
100-199 65  36  29 
200-499 75  48  27 
500+ 92  48  44 
Single independent  30 6  24 
Belongs to multi-site firm  58 29  29 
Foreign owned  49 27  22 
Domestically owned  50 22  28 
Establishment age: 
<5 years old  38  18  20 
5-9 years old  46  13  33 
≥10 years old  51  25  26 
Decade workplace was born: 
Birth <1980  50  32  18 
Birth 1980s  -  16  - 
Birth 1990s  -  15  - 
Birth 2000s  -  18  - 
 
Source: Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys, 1980-2004 
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Table 3:  Union recognition, private sector, 1980-2004  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Pooled  1980 1984 1990 1998 2004 
Industry (ref: 
other services) 
      
Energy and 
water 
0.395 0.387 0.237 0.490 0.592 0.206 
 (6.21)**  (3.93)**  (1.54)  (4.32)**  (9.77)**  (0.94) 
Minerals, 
chemicals 
0.108 0.079 0.030 0.181 0.005 0.308 
 (1.99)*  (0.78)  (0.28)  (1.59) (0.06) (2.07)* 
Metal, 
engineering 
0.034 0.147 0.030 -0.017  0.006 0.026 
  (0.91) (1.67) (0.31) (0.18) (0.09) (0.31) 
Other 
manufacturing 
0.108 0.148 0.138 0.069 0.146 0.106 
 (3.07)**  (1.69)  (1.49) (0.79) (2.25)*  (1.27) 
Construction  0.041 0.020 0.006 0.075 0.115 -0.009 
  (0.87) (0.20) (0.05) (0.59) (1.11) (0.11) 
Distribution 
and hotels 
-0.093 -0.061 0.038  -0.098 -0.136 -0.131 
  (3.28)**  (0.85) (0.49) (1.41) (2.58)**  (2.68)** 
Transport and 
communication 
0.167 0.115 0.312 0.206 0.142 0.161 
 (3.59)**  (1.05)  (2.46)* (1.93)  (1.88)  (1.87) 
Banking and 
finance 
0.063 0.051 0.220 0.072 0.034 0.004 
 (1.87)  (0.52)  (2.24)*  (0.85) (0.62) (0.06) 
Region (ref: 
south east) 
      
East anglia  0.033  0.046  -0.113  -0.041  0.009  0.141 
  (0.75) (0.55) (1.27) (0.46) (0.13) (1.53) 
East  Midlands  0.083 0.159 -0.003  0.100 0.091 0.055 
 (2.80)**  (2.33)*  (0.04) (1.27) (1.79) (1.02) 
North  0.110 0.180 0.188 0.083 0.061 0.009 
 (2.90)**  (1.98)*  (1.73) (0.92) (1.23) (0.16) 
North  West  0.158 0.157 0.219 0.103 0.198 0.102 
 (5.58)**  (2.65)**  (3.11)** (1.49)  (3.19)** (2.25)* 
Scotland 0.154 0.232 0.032 0.079 0.098 0.280 
  (4.72)**  (3.49)**  (0.39) (1.28) (1.71) (3.80)** 
South West  0.078  -0.104  0.162  -0.006  0.110  0.114 
 (2.24)*  (1.58)  (1.96)  (0.08) (1.66) (2.10)* 
Wales  0.192 0.241 0.294 0.091 0.106 0.204 
 (4.11)**  (2.04)*  (2.23)* (0.81)  (1.32)  (2.35)* 
West  Midlands  0.123 0.236 0.153 0.013 0.098 0.096 
 (4.04)**  (3.40)**  (2.05)* (0.16)  (1.45)  (1.84) 
Yorkshire and 
Humberside 
0.112 0.165 0.245 0.027 -0.042  0.205 




      
50-99  0.034 0.082 0.099 0.041 0.039 -0.088 
 (1.79)  (1.85)  (2.04)*  (0.91) (1.11) (2.51)* 
100-199 0.144  0.132  0.240 0.069 0.195 0.096 
 (6.56)**  (2.96)**  (4.58)** (1.45)  (4.73)** (2.02)* 
200-499 0.253  0.209  0.246 0.262 0.330 0.198   18
 (10.91)**  (4.32)**  (4.50)**  (4.87)** (7.63)** (4.09)** 
500+  0.325 0.298 0.399 0.303 0.410 0.200 
 (13.79)**  (6.75)**  (7.73)**  (5.71)** (7.98)** (3.72)** 
Foreign  -0.093 -0.154 0.005  -0.024 -0.204 -0.068 
 (3.57)**  (2.23)*  (0.07)  (0.37) (5.34)**  (1.60) 
Single  -0.230 -0.301 -0.167 -0.227 -0.186 -0.259 
 (12.51)**  (8.01)**  (3.38)**  (5.41)** (5.54)** (7.52)** 
Workplace 
age (ref: 10+ 
years) 
      
<5  years  -0.049 -0.118 -0.021 -0.106 -0.048 -0.011 
 (1.87)  (1.80)  (0.25)  (1.98)* (1.14)  (0.21) 
5-9  years  -0.105 -0.063 -0.089 -0.243 -0.055 -0.095 
 (4.56)**  (1.25)  (1.42)  (5.39)**  (1.14)  (2.70)** 
Proportion 
female 
-0.078 -0.122 -0.225 -0.083 0.011  -0.035 
 (1.85)  (1.47)  (2.00)*  (0.93) (0.12) (0.39) 
Proportion 
part-time 
0.020  -0.170 -0.022 -0.043 0.125  0.016 
  (0.45) (1.53) (0.15) (0.39) (1.35) (0.23) 
Proportion 
non-manual 
-0.070 -0.202 -0.234 -0.069 0.006  0.024 
 (2.54)*  (2.79)**  (3.04)** (1.03)  (0.13)  (0.56) 
Survey year 
(ref: 1980) 
      
wirs1984  -0.012       
  (0.44)       
wirs1990  -0.116       
  (4.41)**       
wirs1998  -0.213       
  (8.35)**       
wirs2004  -0.241       
  (9.30)**       
Constant 0.496 0.572 0.490 0.472 0.188 0.239 
 (11.73)**  (5.86)**  (5.14)**  (4.87)** (2.79)** (3.06)** 
Observations  5840 1273 1081 1189 1241 1056 
R-squared  0.22 0.27 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.23 
 
Source: Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys, 1980-2004   19
Table 4:  Effects of Compositional and Within-group Change on Union Recognition, 
Private Sector 1980-2004 
 

















1980  49.5  - - - - 
2004 22.3  -27.2  40.8  -8.7  (32%)  -18.5  (68%) 
 
Note: to obtain these figures we generate the predicted probability of union recognition using the 1980 and 2004 
models in Table 3.  The change in union recognition due solely to compositional change is obtained by applying 
the predictions under the 1980 model to the 2004 sample.  The resulting union recognition rate is the rate that 
would have obtained in 1980 with 2004 workplace characteristics, that is, with compositional change alone.  
The difference between this rate and the overall change in union recognition is due to within-group change.  
 
Source: Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys, 1980-2004   20
Table 5:  Union Membership Hourly Wage Premium, WERS 2004, private sector 
workplaces  
 





























0.082 0.058 0.064 0.198 0.090 0.079 
  (7.83)** (6.84)** (6.94)** (7.13)** (3.66)** (2.95)** 
Union 
recognition 
  -0.011    0.031 
    (1.24)    (1.13) 
DK if union 
recognition 
  0.032    -0.168 
    (1.93)*    (3.96)** 
Observations 11,894  11,838  11,838  2,746  2,742  2,742 
 
Notes:  
(1) Interval regression for hourly wages, unweighted, robust estimator. T-stats in parentheses 
(2) Controls are: male, age (10 dummies), academic qualifications (9 dummies), vocational 
qualifications (4 dummies), health problem, non-white, full-time employment, occupation (10 
dummies), firm size (3 dummies), single establishment organization, industry (10 dummies), 
workplace aged 25+ years, foreign owned, largest occupational group (8 dummies). 
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Table 6:  Private sector union/non-union hourly wage differentials, 1993-2006 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)                            (4)                          (5)                        (6) 
       1993-1999         1993-1999    1993-1999             2000-2006   2000-2006           2000-2006 
                                   All                  <25 employees        ≥25 employees                  All                 <25 employees         ≥25 employees   
Union  .0566 (11.67)  .1144 (9.86)  .0452 (8.62)  .0277 (6.23)  .0933 (9.29)  .0121 (2.45) 
Age  .0656 (75.72)  .0592 (43.89)  .0706 (62.06)  .0635 (82.77)  .0561 (48.39)  .0697 (67.79) 
Age
2  -.0007 (65.65)  -.0006 (38.35)  -.0008 (53.70)  -.0007 (73.05)  -.0006 (43.00)  -.0008 (59.74) 
Male  .2011 (47.87)  .1852 (25.29)  .2096 (41.21)  .1718 (46.38)  .1576 (25.07)  .1817 (39.82) 
Black  -.1538 (8.28)  -.1003 (2.94)  -.1746 (8.02)  -.1649 (11.13)  -.1396 (5.28)  -.1727 (9.76) 
Asian  -.1682 (12.41)   -.1698 (6.93)  -.1670 (10.41)  -.1315 (12.54)  -.1432 (7.72)  -.1206 (9.58) 
Chinese  -.0202 (0.49)  -.0602 (1.07)  .0620 (0.96)  -.1459 (4.43)  -.1534 (3.16)  -.1161 (2.58) 
Other races  -.0312 (1.55)  -.0133 (0.38)  -.0388 (1.58)  -.1105 (7.23)  -.1115 (4.24)  -.1040 (5.59) 
 
Constant    .3263  .3057 .3457 .8946  .8941 .8633 
 
Size  dummies  6  3 3 6  3 3   
Schooling dummies  40  40  40   47  47  47 
 
Adjusted R
2    .4549  .3487 .4722 .4624  .3686 .4867 
N                         63,295  23,942  39,353  74,323  28,626  45,697 
 
 
Source: LFS 1993-2006 Autumn quarters.  Notes: all equations also include 6 year dummies, 21 region of work dummies  
and 61 industry dummies. Excluded category is white.  Employees only. T-statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 7: Union effects on employment growth among private sector workplaces with 25+ employees 
 
  Pooled  1980 1984 1990 1998 2004  1990-2004 
All  .032 -.003 .013 .024 .075 .043 .049 
Union  .003 -.016  -.007 .014 .022 .024 .003 
Non-union  .048 .001 .033 .029 .092 .048 .048 
































(1) Rows 1, 2 and 3 are unconditional weighted means for log employment growth which is log((employment in t minus employment in previous 
year)/ employment in previous year) having removed 12 outliers.   
(2) Row 4’s ‘raw gap’ is the union recognition coefficient (t-statistics in parentheses) for unweighted OLS estimates of log employment in time 
t.  Log employment in t-1 is one of the explanatory variables. *=significant at a 90% confidence level; **=significant at a 95% confidence level 
or above 
(3) Row 5’s regression adjusted gap in log employment controls log employment in t-1; single-digit SIC; region; single; foreign, % female; % 
part-time; % non-manual; workplace age. 
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Table 8:  Union effects on workplace financial performance relative to industry average among private sector workplaces with 25+ 
employees 
 
  Pooled  1980 1984 1990 1998 2004  1990-2004 
All  2.45 2.41 2.40 2.48 2.53 2.49 2.51 
Union  2.40 2.37 2.32 2.50 2.51 2.37 2.47 
Non-union  2.50 2.46 2.48 2.47 2.53 2.52 2.52 
































(1) Rows 1 and 2 are unconditional survey-weighted means for financial performance relative to industry average where 1=below/a lot below 
average 2=average 3=above/a lot above average.   
(2) Row 3’s ‘raw gap’ is the coefficient with z-statistics in parentheses for unweighted ordered logit estimates of the (1, 3) financial performance 
measure. *=significant at a 90% confidence level; **=significant at a 95% confidence level or above 
(3) Row 4’s regression adjusted gap controls for single-digit SIC; region; establishment size; single; foreign, % female; % part-time; % non-
manual; workplace age. 
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Table 9: Managerial Perceptions of the employment relations climate among private sector workplaces with 25+ employees 
 
  1980 1984 1990 1998 2004 
  All  U    NU  All  U    NU All U NU All U NU All U NU 
Average  3  3 3 4  4 4 7  12 4 9  8 9 7  10 6 
Good  45 49 41  54 61 46  59 60 59  52 53 52  55 58 54 
Very  good 52 48 56  42 35 50  34 28 37  39 39 39  38 32 40 
 
Notes: 
(1) U = workplace with recognised union(s),  NU = workplace without recognised union(s), Table shows column percentages, survey weighted 
data. 
(2) Unweighted N for whole series is 5,805.  Union workplaces N=3,146.  Non-union workpl   aces N=2,659. 
(3) 5-point climate scale collapsed into three points: average/poor; good; and very good. 
 
 
Table 10: Union effects on employment relations climate among private sector workplaces with 25+ employees 
 
  Pooled  1980 1984 1990 1998 2004  1990-2004 
All  2.35 2.49 2.38 2.26 2.30 2.31 2.29 
Union  2.31 2.46 2.31 2.16 2.31 2.22 2.23 
Non-union  2.37 2.53 2.46 2.32 2.29 2.34 2.32 
































(1) Rows 1, 2 and 3 are unconditional means for employment relations climate where 1=poor/average 2=good 3=very good.   
(2) Row 4’s ‘raw gap’ is the union coefficient with z-statistics in parentheses for unweighted ordered logit estimates of the (1,3) climate 
measure. *=significant at a 90% confidence level; **=significant at a 95% confidence level or above 
(3) Row 5’s regression adjusted gap controls for single-digit SIC; region; establishment size; single; foreign, % female; % part-time; % non-
manual; workplace age.  25
Table 11: Union effects on employment relations climate among private sector employees in British Social Attitudes Surveys, 1983-2005 
 
 Pooled,  1983-2005  1983-1989  1990-1995  1996-2000  2001-2005 
All 3.12  3.17  3.06  3.10  3.17 
Union 2.96  3.02  2.91  2.91  3.02 
Non-union 3.23  3.32  3.20  3.19  3.24 
























(1) Rows 1, 2 and 3 are unconditional means for employment relations climate where 1=not at all good 2=not very good 3=good 4=very good.  
Unweighted N for pooled regressions is 19,190 
(2) Row 4’s ‘raw gap’ is the union coefficient with z-statistics in parentheses for unweighted ordered logit estimates of the (1,4) climate 
measure. *=significant at a 90% confidence level; **=significant at a 95% confidence level or above 
(3) Row 5’s regression adjusted gap controls for union membership; female; age (6 dummies); ethnic dummy; region (6 dummies); sector (4 
dummies); part-time dummy; social class (8 dummies); years  CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
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